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Bioethics is an experiment in culture. As controversial new biological and medical  
technologies arise, the “public,” with all its institutional and ideological diversity  
in tow, responds – often in a cacophony of conflicting policy prescriptions. The res-
ulting chaos thus requires a special class of professionals – the bioethicists – to de-
termine the “appropriate” position, i.e. which research and practices should be al-
lowed, funded and released to the public, and which should be condemned or even  
criminalized. In theory, the appropriate policies are determined and enacted, the ap-
propriate research and practices go forward, and the public accepts and applauds  
the wisdom of  biomedical  elites.  The reality  is  far messier.  Over the past  thirty  
years, bioethics – a field established to resolve conflict – has itself become a source of  
conflict and dispute. As such, this paper focuses on religion and genetics to chart  
the evolution of the American experiment with bioethics. The history reveals two  
primary trends: the “rationalization” of bioethics in the 1970s and 80s; and the cor-
responding conservative “Christian” backlash beginning in the 1990s. Addition-
ally, the focus on controversial genetic research highlights the growing politiciza-
tion of bioethics and Presidential bioethical committees as well as the use of bioeth-
ical issues in political elections. Finally, the first decade of the current millennium  
provides yet another twist: the growing importance of non-traditional or “radical”  
bioethics and more “liberal” Christian positions. 
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Bioethics is an experiment in culture. As controversial new biological and 
medical technologies arise, the “public,” with all its institutional and ideolo-
gical diversity in tow, responds – often in a cacophony of conflicting policy 
prescriptions. The resulting chaos thus requires a special class of profession-
als – the bioethicists – to determine the “appropriate” position, i.e. which re-
search and practices should be allowed, funded and released to the public, 
and which should be condemned or even criminalized. In theory, the ap-
propriate policies are determined and enacted, the appropriate research and 
practices go forward, and the public accepts and applauds the wisdom of 
biomedical elites. The reality is far messier.
Over the past thirty years, bioethics – a field established to resolve con-
flict  – has itself  become a source of conflict  and dispute. Previous to the 
1970s,  medical  ethics  remained  indebted  to  Christian  moral  traditions. 
However, the lack of public consensus on genetic engineering, abortion, eu-
thanasia and other challenging issues led to the formalization and “rational-
ization” of bioethics.  Part of this  response was the establishment  of  pro-
grams of scientific outreach designed to minimize public criticism of genetic 
engineering and address issues in science and religion. However, a counter-
response  has  been the  re-assertion  of  “Christian”  bioethics.  For  the  past 
three decades, organized religious communities attempted to play a more 
overt role in policy: a letter from three religious leaders to President Carter 
in 1980 led to the President’s Commission’s study of genetic engineering; 
twenty  years  later,  many conservative  religious  leaders  opposed  genetic 
patenting, cloning, and stem cell research on moral grounds. By the 1990s, 
many religious conservatives, arguing that professional bioethicists were in-
herently secular and unfairly biased towards the research enterprise, organ-
ized a counter movement of explicitly “Christian” bioethics. Organizations 
such as the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity (CBHD) and the Ethics 
and Public Policy Center (EPPC) represent this Christian “backlash” against 
“secular” bioethics.”
This paper charts the evolution of the American experiment with bioeth-
ics, with a focus on religion and genetics. The history reveals two primary 
trends: the “rationalization” of bioethics in the 1970s and 80s; and the corres-
ponding conservative “Christian” backlash beginning in the 1990s. Addition-
ally, the focus on controversial genetic research highlights the growing politi-
cization of bioethics and Presidential bioethical committees as well as the use 
of bioethical issues in political elections. Finally, the first decade of the current 
millennium provides yet another twist: the growing importance of non-tradi-
tional or “radical” bioethics and more “liberal” Christian positions.
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1. RELIGION AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF BIOETHICS
The history of medical ethics dates to antiquity; the Hippocratic maxim to 
“benefit and do no harm” remains at the core of modern medical ethics.1 
The American Medical Association (AMA) established a code of ethics in 
1848 to regulate medical practice; one hundred years later, revelations about 
Nazi medical  experimentation led to the Nuremberg Code requiring “in-
formed consent” from human subjects involved in research. The introduc-
tion of dialysis machines in the 1960s, and the resulting “God committees” 
formed to decide who would receive the life-saving treatments, strained the 
medical  community’s ethical consensus. At the same time, a cultural em-
phasis on individual rights merged with growing concerns over biomedi-
cine. The 1968 Mondale hearings, one of the first congressional hearings to 
address  advances  like  genetic  engineering  and  organ  transplantation, 
demonstrated the tension between the platforms of scientific faith and sci-
entific critique.
Designed to stimulate discussion of biomedical ethics, the Mondale hear-
ings assembled a diverse group of scientists, theologians, and academics to 
debate potential consequences and regulation. Among the participants was 
the Rev. Kenneth Vaux, who asked, “What will it profit us if we gain the 
whole world and forfeit our soul?” – offering what I will call the “holistic” 
perspective.2 I use the term “holistic” here for two reasons: one, because of 
the question’s emphasis on humanity rather than the individual; and two, 
because such questions later merged with those presuming an “organic” or 
“living” globe – essentially a “holistic” spiritual ecology. In response, scient-
ists  vehemently  defended  their  territory  from  the  interlopers.  Christian 
Barnard, the heart-transplant specialist, argued that the public was unquali-
fied to make research decisions; other scientists drew parallels to Lysenko-
ism and the trial of Galileo. Their reaction upset Senator Walter Mondale 
(D-MN), who stated, “I was frankly taken aback by the spirited opposition 
expressed by several  men in  the  health  sciences.  Considering  that  I  had 
merely proposed the establishment of a presidential study commission, it 
was  difficult  to  understand  the  opposition.”  He  continued  sarcastically, 
“some did condescend to admit that they would appreciate continued – or 
increased – financial support from the government for their endeavors. But 
please don’t distract us with any questions.”3
1 Hippocrates, ‘Epidemics I’ in  Hippocrates with an English Translation, vol. 1, trans. W. H. S. 
Jones, 1959, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 165.
2 The Mondale Hearings are addressed in Jonsen, Albert R. 1998, The Birth of Bioethics, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. Quote on 92.
3 Ibid, 93.
10 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 3:1
While the hearings did not result in new regulations or oversight com-
mittees, one can discern the framework for future debates over genetic en-
gineering – debates in which scientists, playing to an American “civil reli-
gion” emphasizing scientific progress, spoke about social advance, anticip-
ated medical benefits, and maintaining research autonomy and funding. At 
the same time, Vaux’s more “holistic” perspective is indicative of the ap-
proach taken later by many religious and environmental groups. Sociologist 
John Evans writes about the significance of “framing” in bioethics.4 For ex-
ample, abortion, a central issue, can be framed as a “Right to Life” issue or 
as an “Individual Rights” issue, depending on the intended effect and audi-
ence. Such “frames” are critical to manipulate public opinion towards new 
technologies.  For opponents of genetic engineering, the “commodification 
of life,” “biohazards,” and the “loss of human dignity” are legitimate policy 
concerns, as they consistently frame discussions in terms of long-term im-
pacts, whether on the environment or on the “soul” of man. And while the 
public remained largely unaware of the emerging genetic issues, profession-
al bioethics, a merger of theological and philosophical traditions, blossomed 
as other advances challenged the moral status of biomedical research.5 
The development of bioethics as a public policy discipline resulted from 
a number of historical trends, including advances in biomedicine and ques-
tions  of  resource  allocation  and justice.  More  specifically,  the  1970s  wit-
nessed the  Roe v Wade (1973) decision, organ transplants and issues of re-
source  allocation,  questions  regarding  PKU genetic  screening,  the  Karen 
Ann Quinlan euthanasia case, and fetal research (in vitro fertilization).6 The 
wide assortment of issues attracted attention from diverse groups. Many re-
ligious communities felt genetic screening would increase abortions of “de-
fective” babies while the Roe v. Wade (1973) decision and questions regard-
ing fetal research ensured the active participation of women’s groups. Rev-
elations of improper medical conduct and a lack of consent in the Tuskegee 
syphilis study heightened public awareness about regulation and control of 
research,  as  many questioned whether  researchers could be  trusted with 
ethical responsibilities.  These controversies revived the study of ethics by 
forcing an academic, philosophic tradition out of the ivory tower, and theo-
4 Evans, John. 1999, “The Uneven Playing Field of the Dialogue on Patenting,” in Perspectives  
on Genetic Patenting: Religion, Science and Industry in Dialogue, ed. Audrey Chapman, AAAS 
publishing, Washington, DC. See pages 57-74.
5 Albert  Jonsen  observes  that  early  bioethicists,  such  as  Joseph Fletcher,  Paul  Ramsey  or 
Richard McCormick, often came from theological traditions, although many resigned their 
ordinations or found employment at secular institutions during the “professionalization” 
phase of the field. See “The Theologians: Rediscovering the Tradition,” in Jonsen,  Birth of  
Bioethics, 34-64. 
6 Stevens, M.L. Tina. 2000,  Bioethics in America: Origins and Cultural Politics, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore. Especially pages 8-45.
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logians from the seminary, to confront issues that demanded resolution.7 
Historian Tina Stevens, who underscores the fears over genetic engineering 
and  eugenics,  links  the  bioethics  movement  to  the  “responsible  science 
movement”  of  the  1950s  and 1960s,  particularly  the  control  over  atomic 
weapons. As such, the new field “assisted in transforming alarm over exotic 
technologies into a situation in which ethical experts manage problems.”8 
She continues, “even while the stress over biotechnology was erupting, the 
process  of  disrupting that  distress  also  had begun,”  so  that  “the  role of 
bioethics from the 1960s to the 1970s may be seen as one in the transition 
from critique to management.”9
By the early 1970s, bioethics was a recognized field; the first Encyclopedia 
of Bioethics appeared in 1972. Institutions soon followed. Bioethicist Albert 
Jonsen remembers the 1960s as a time of conferences and the 1970s as a time 
of centers. Christians, particularly Catholics,  were influential in this early 
stage: Daniel Callahan helped establish the Hastings Center in 1969; André 
Hellegers was equally instrumental in the founding of the Kennedy Insti-
tute in 1971. These two institutions, perhaps the premier independent cen-
ters for  bioethics,  mixed theologians,  philosophers,  lawyers,  and sociolo-
gists in the search for a viable bioethical platform. At the same time, Pope 
John XXIII  chartered the  Medical-Moral  Research  and Education  Center, 
laying the groundwork for the National Catholic Bioethics Center.10 Yet the 
participation of Christians complicated the new field, as bioethics, with its 
legal and political implications, is a creature of the public sphere. 
The search for universal principles inevitably marginalized sectarian re-
ligious voices. The goal became a “Secular framework of thought, oriented 
toward forging universal principles of a ‘common morality,’ that not only 
eschewed but rose above the particularism of cultural, ethical, and religious 
differences.”11 This framework, formalized in the “principlism” of  The Bel-
mont Report (1978), recommended justice, autonomy, and beneficence as ap-
propriate guidelines.  However, the field vacillated between deontological 
ethics (lying is always wrong) and consequentialist ethics (lying maybe ap-
propriate in certain circumstances). Neither approach, according to bioethi-
cist Daniel Callahan, is completely satisfactory:
7 Toulmin, Stephen. 1982, “How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics,”  Perspectives in Biology  
and Medicine, vol. 25, pp. 736-50.
8 Stevens, Bioethics in America, quote on xiii.
9 Ibid., 149, 151.
10 From  “Twenty-five  Years  of  Service,”  available  at  http://www.ncbcenter.org/access_
history.html. Accessed Jan. 15, 2003. 
11 Messikomer, Carla, Fox, Renee, and Swazey, Judith. 2001, “The Presence and Influence of 
Religion in American Bioethics,”  Perspectives  in Biology and Medicine,  vol.44, pp. 484-508. 
Quote on 492.
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“Both have problems: If one tries to hold on to a universalist, coolly rational  
mode of analysis, floating above culture and class, no room is left for the  
play of passion, context and ideology. Lofty abstractions win the day. If, in  
contrast, one tries to recognize situation and circumstance, the result may  
be subservience to the interests of class and tribe, to our crowd and the pas-
sions of the moment.”12
In addition, the new field now required a “publicly-accessible” language 
that stripped religious voices of their authenticity.
Sociologist  John Evans recently examined this dynamic in the debates 
over human genetic engineering. An expression of Weberian “rationaliza-
tion,”  the “rationalization”  of bioethics  led to  a “thinning”  of debate,  as 
“holistic” or “heavy” questions were essentially ignored in favor of solv-
able, mundane problems.13 Religious and environmental opponents of ge-
netic engineering, forced to translate their long-term spiritual concerns into 
secular, policy-oriented language, were left speaking a “Moral Esperanto” 
incapable of influencing the debate.14 As Barbara Katz Rothman summar-
izes, “They start off talking about playing God and end up talking about ex-
tra filters in laboratory safety hoods.”15 Indeed, many in the bioethics pro-
fession assume a “natural progression of human reason, a progressive en-
lightenment  away from emotional,  often religiously  based arguments  to-
ward  more  ‘rational,’  calculating,  scientific,  ‘neutral’  arguments.”16 Thus 
bioethicists tend to agree with the scientific community, becoming translat-
ors, apologists, and sometimes enablers of scientific “progress.”17 From this 
perspective, the scientific community “won:” the debates installed secular 
bioethicists as the appropriate voice in science policy discussions, arguably 
guaranteeing verdicts amenable to the research community.
Religious bioethicists highlight numerous problems with this universal, 
and secular, approach. Callahan argues it leaves bioethics too dependent on 
law as the “working source of morality” given that legal approaches can 
only tell us what is “forbidden or acceptable,” not what is “commendable or 
right.”18 With religion relegated to the private sphere, he notes the irony of a 
12 Callahan, Daniel. 1997, “Bioethics and the Culture Wars,” vol. 264, pp. 23-24. Quote on 24.
13 Evans, John H. 2002, Playing God? Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public  
Bioethical Discourse, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. I should note that Evans uses the 
term “substantive rationality” to refer to questions I have called “holistic” or “heavy.”
14 The term “Moral Esperanto” comes from John Evans, quoted in Rothman, Barbara Katz. 
1998, The Book of Life: A Personal and Ethical Guide to Race, Normalcy, and the Implications of the 
Human Genome Project, Beacon Press, Boston. Quote on 37.
15 Rothman, The Book of Life, 37.
16 Evans, Playing God?, 24. 
17 Rothman, The Book of Life, 37.
18 Callahan, Daniel. 1990, “Religion and the Secularization of Bioethics,” The Hastings Center  
Report, vol. 20, pp. s2-s4. Quote on s4.
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pluralistic approach, “which becomes a form of oppression if,  in its  very 
name, we are told to shut up in public about our private lives and beliefs.”19 
So religious voices become a “curiosity” in the public arena and muted, or 
suspect,  within academe.20 Universal approaches, according to Allen Ver-
hey, reduce human experience to the minimum ethical standards that can 
be defended rationally but  ignore the “minimal  character  of  such  stand-
ards.”21 This is problematic for many believers because issues of life, death, 
and suffering are infused with religious meaning and “Playing God” is a 
serious critique. Thus it is not surprising that genetic engineering, among 
many other issues, became so controversial.
2. RELIGION, GENETICS AND
THE GROWTH OF “PROFESSIONAL” BIOETHICS
In 1977, Science writer Nicholas Wade observed, “one sector of the public 
that has been strangely loath to say its piece on gene splicing is the religious 
community.”22 Indeed, the religious response to genetic engineering grew 
slowly in the 1970s, becoming politically active only in the late 1970s. For 
example, in 1972, a coalition of Presbyterians, Methodists and Episcopalians 
published a study of the “new” genetics (recommending caution), while nu-
merous debates occurred within the nascent  bioethical  community.23 The 
World Council of Churches held its first conference on genetics in 1973; in 
1979, its conference on “Faith, Science and the Future,” held at M.I.T., as-
sembled 313 delegates from 59 countries representing 40 Christian churches 
and a “scattering of Jews, Muslims and Buddhists.”24 By 1977 articles on ge-
netic  engineering had appeared in a variety of religious publications,  in-
cluding Christian Century,  Christianity Today,  New Catholic World,  U.S. Cath-
olic, America, and Commonweal.
Religious opponents of rDNA research exploited the division within the 
scientific  community and relied on an essential  theme – materialism – to 
link a diverse set of scientific  practices and ethical questions.  A  Christian  
Century article praised “Science for the People” – a group of young activist 
19 Ibid. 
20 Lammers, Stephen J. 1996, “The Marginalization of Religious Voices in Bioethics,” in  Reli-
gion and Medical Ethics: Looking Backward, Looking Forward, ed. Allen Verhey,  Wm. B. Eerd-
mans Publishing, Michigan. 
21 Verhey, Allen. 1990, “Talking of God – But with Whom?” The Hastings Center Report, vol. 20, 
pp. 21-s24. Quote on s24.
22 Wade, Ultimate Experiment, 124-43.
23 The coalition included the National Presbyterian Center, the Board of Christian Social Con-
cerns of the United Methodist Church, and the Episcopal Cathedral of the Diocese of Wash-
ington. See Hamilton, Michael O. 1972,  The New Genetics and the Future of Man, Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, Michigan. 
24 Regarding the 1973 conference, see Chapman, Unprecedented Choices, 32. For the 1979 confer-
ence, see Cort, John C. 1979, “Science, Faith & Future,” Commonweal, vol. 106, pp. 517-19.
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scientists at Harvard and M.I.T. – for protests that were “forthright, though 
not disruptive, in calling the scientific establishment to account.”25 Indeed, 
“Science for the People,” along with Chargaff, appear regularly as the ap-
propriate spokespeople for science in the religious literature of the period. 
The evangelical publication  Christian Century was especially careful to ex-
ploit the prestige of scientists, as Paul Schimmel, professor of biochemistry 
and biophysics at M.I.T., Roger C. Sider, professor of psychiatry at the Uni-
versity of Rochester Medical Center, and Craig Ellison, professor of psycho-
logy  at  Simpson  College,  all  published  articles  condemning  rDNA  re-
search.26 These articles stressed the need for evangelical action and linked 
genetic engineering to a host of other bioethical issues, including euthanas-
ia, abortion, and in vitro fertilization.
In the debates of the 1970s, religious conservatives created an enduring 
stereotype of the biological sciences as being based on rampant reduction-
ism, secularism and individualism. In one article, Roger Sider lauded bio-
logy as the new “queen of the sciences,” noting that the present upheavals 
were “important to evangelicals” because “science is the intellectual temple 
of modern culture, and since biology is its chief god, a revolution in biology 
is bound to permeate our entire society.”27 Paul Schimmel agreed, writing, 
“there is no question that genetic engineering has spiritual ramifications,” 
adding that recombinant DNA techniques shift  “thinking from the meta-
physical  to the physical,”  causing us to see “humans and life itself  as so 
much machinery.” Schimmel worried about man’s attempt to “play God” 
and warned of artificial genetic species upsetting “the balance of nature in 
some unforeseen way.”28 Craig Ellison tied in vitro fertilization and genetic 
engineering to concerns over the family and warned, “when progress is ab-
solutized, people tend to justify unethical means to accomplish the ends.”29 
Another article connected sociobiology, genetic determinism, and abortion 
to a Hitler-esque “Gene Cult,” forcefully demanding that evangelicals “have 
a responsibility to tear down strongholds [the secularism of sociobiology] 
25 Nelson, J. 1976, “The Advancement of Human Science,” Christian Century, vol. 93, pp. 418. 
“Science for the People,” founded in 1969, was a response to Arthur Jensen’s article that 
blacks were genetically inferior to whites. Throughout the 1970s, the group warned about 
potential misuses of genetics, often being angrily dismissed by the scientific community. Jon 
Beckwith, a founding member, describes this backlash in Beckwith, Jon. 2002, Making Genes,  
Making Waves: A Social Activist in Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. See es-
pecially pp. 53-57.
26 Shimmel, Paul. 1978, “Genetic Engineering: Blessing or Curse?” Christianity Today, vol. 22, 
pp. 1085-86; Sider, Roger. 1978, “The New Biology: In Search of a Soul,” Christianity Today, 
vol. 22, pp. 580-85; and Ellison, Craig. 1979, “Engineering Humans: Who is to do what to 
whom,” Christianity Today, vol. 23, pp. 459-62.
27 Sider, “The New Biology,” 580, 584.
28 Schimmel, “Genetic Engineering,” 1086 and 1085 respectively. 
29 Ellison, “Engineering Humans,” 461.
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raised against the knowledge of God.”30 A series of later articles and editori-
als combined all the issues into a “secular culture of materialism,” as one 
article declared:
“What to do about splicing genes, it seems to us, will be decided on the same  
basis as abortion and euthanasia. If ‘life’ is purely material, then anything  
goes: there are no moral boundaries. The trend in public policy in recent dec-
ades decidedly has been away from a definition of life as something special  
and sacred and towards a definition that is ‘physico-chemical’.”31
Although additional articles maintained this critique, perhaps in an at-
tempt to jockey for political power (addressed later), it  was the Supreme 
Court’s approval of organic patents that led to the participation of religious 
communities in genetic science policy.32
In a monumental decision handed down on June 25, 1980, the Supreme 
Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that man-made life-forms were subject 
to patent laws and protection.33 The decision resolved a long-standing issue 
on patents and organic material, as the case dated to 1972, when Ananda 
Chakrabarty, a researcher at General Electric, applied for a patent on a form 
of Pseudomonas bacteria bred to digest oil slicks.34 By a narrow 5 to 4 margin 
the court construed the Patent Act, originally drafted by Thomas Jefferson, 
so as to include all products of human invention, relying on a 1952 Senate 
report that recognized as patentable “anything under the sun that is made 
by man.”35 Chief Justice W. Burger’s majority opinion seemed tainted with 
materialism, stating: “In short, we think the fact that micro-organisms, as 
distinguished from chemical compounds, are alive, is a distinction without 
legal significance.”36 But previous patents on organisms, such as Pasteur’s 
1873 claim to purified yeast, were actually “process” patents – patents gran-
ted for the process (fermentation), not the organism.37 More than any other 
single event, the ruling galvanized mainstream religious communities and 
resulted, a mere three days later,  in a letter to President  Carter from the 
30 Bohlin, Ray. 1981, “Sociobiology: Cloned from the Gene Cult,”  Christianity Today, vol. 25, 
pp. 84-88. Quote on 84.
31 Anon. 1981, “Life Manipulators Must Await Society’s Consensus on the Limits of Science,” 
Christianity Today, vol. 25, pp. 12-13. Quote on 13.
32 For additional articles, see Anon. 1981, “Curses or Prayers for Genetic Engineers?”  Chris-
tianity Today, vol.  26, pp.647; Angus, Fay. 1981, “The Promise and Perils of Genetic Med-
dling,” Christianity Today, vol. 26, pp.659-62.
33 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
34 Wade, Nicholas. 1980, “Court Says Lab-Made Life Can Be Patented,” Science, vol. 208, pp. 1445.
35 The Senate report is quoted in Jasanoff, Sheila. 1995, Science at the Bar: Law, Science and Tech-
nology in America, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Quote on 144. For an excel-
lent introduction to this issue, see chapter seven, “Legal Encounters with Genetic Engineer-
ing.” 
36 Justice Buger, quoted in Wade, “Court Says Lab-Made Life Can Be Patented,” 1445.
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three  General  Secretaries  of  the  National  Council  of  Churches,  the  Syn-
agogue Council of America and the United States Catholic Conference. It 
would prove remarkably influential. 
While the letter admitted that genetic engineering might be an “oppor-
tunity for doing good” and new life forms might have “dramatic potential 
for  improving  human life,”  it  was  clear  about  the  “fundamental  danger 
triggered by the rapid growth of genetic engineering.”38 A mere page and 
half in length, the text addressed most of the themes present in the larger 
public  controversy. It  emphasized the “Frankenstein” problem – that  we 
might not be able to “recall a new life form” – noting that both DDT and 
DES were in wide use before discovery of their tragic side effects. The letter 
raised the Nazi eugenic specter and questioned our “playing God:” “His-
tory has shown us that there will always be those who believe it appropriate 
to ‘correct’ our mental and social structures by genetic means, so as to fit 
their  vision  of  humanity.  This  becomes  more  dangerous  when the  basic 
tools to do so are finally at hand. Those who would play God will be temp-
ted as never before.” Admitting that it would be naive to ask private corpor-
ations to abandon the profit motive, the secretaries posed “heavy” questions 
instead,  asking,  “Yet when the products are new life  forms,  with all  the 
risks entailed, shouldn’t there be a broader criteria than profit for determin-
ing their use and distribution?” The letter argued that such questions dealt 
with the “fundamental nature of human life and the dignity and worth of 
the individual human being.” Thus it was not enough for the “commercial, 
scientific and medical communities alone to examine them; they must be ex-
amined by individuals  and groups who represent  the broader public  in-
terest.” The secretaries asked President Carter to “provide a way for repres-
entatives of a broad spectrum of our society to consider these matters and 
advise the government on its necessary role.” Finally, they pledged the con-
tinued engagement of the religious community and requested an appropri-
ate Congressional Committee.
The letter convinced Carter to ask the recently established President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research (1980-83) to address the larger issues of genetic en-
gineering  –  a  task  for  which  the  commission  was  unprepared.  Indeed, 
Carter’s decision, coming months before the 1980 election, is interesting, al-
37 Hubbard, Ruth and Wald, Elijah. 1997, Exploding the Gene Myth: How Genetic Information is  
Produced and Manipulated by Scientists, Physicians, Employers, Insurance Companies, Educators,  
and Law Enforcers, Beacon Press, Boston. Quote on 176.
38 “Letter from Three General Secretaries,” reprinted in the President’s Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 1982, Spli-
cing Life: A Report on the Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Letter reprinted on pp. 95-96.
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though not  extraordinary  given  his  well-publicized  church  membership. 
Still, one cannot help but wonder if political calculations underlay his de-
cision, as he could ill-afford a public backlash, particularly one involving re-
ligious communities,  in the final  months of his campaign against Ronald 
Reagan. Although Reagan’s standard campaign speeches did not specific-
ally  refer  to  genetic  engineering,  certainly  a  portion  of  his  constituency 
viewed genetic engineering as part of a “secular culture of death” that in-
cluded abortion (an election issue) and euthanasia. Thus for many voters, 
genetic engineering, in combination with other bioethical issues, may have 
served as a political rallying cry. Regardless, the President’s Commission, 
working from a model of the earlier National Commission, debated the is-
sues for two years before pronouncing judgement.
The Commission issued its report, entitled Splicing Life: A Report on the  
Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings, in 1982. The 
position of the study was clear from the introduction. Chairman Morris Ab-
ram’s opening letter to President Reagan noted that the study was not with-
in the Commission’s mandate and had instead been prompted by Jewish, 
Catholic  and Protestant organizations that feared genetic technology was 
analogous to Pandora’s box – something the commission “had not found to 
be the case.”39 In seeking to resolve the controversy the commission relied 
on two primary approaches to “secularize” or “rationalize” the debate: first, 
the study dispelled any potential theological conflicts and re-asserted the 
privilege  of  “experts” to  decide  ethical  questions;  second,  the study em-
phasized  scientific  and technological  inevitability  to  mute  “holistic”  and 
long-term critiques. 
Regarding ethical decisions, the report recommended that “public policy 
on genetic engineering draw heavily upon the wisdom of experts who have 
earned the public’s trust and respect.”40 This subtle proclamation exempli-
fies the rationale later used to replace dissenting religious and environment-
al voices with those of professional bioethicists. In addition, the commission 
concluded that concerns voiced by religious groups paralleled those of the 
secular community, and so ethical examinations need not be limited to the 
religious format in which the issues had been raised.  The report also at-
tempted to control the metaphors and images of genetic engineering, de-
nouncing  the  political  use  of  “slogans” such  as  Dr.  Frankenstein  (or  his 
monster),  Pandora, or Nazi eugenics because they “confused” the public. 
Perhaps most  significant  for  later  debates,  the commission  separated the 
risks of gene-splicing technology from the risks of its applications or con-
39 President’s Commission, Splicing Life, i.
40 Ibid., 20
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sequences and stressed the inevitability of its development. The study ad-
mitted,  “genetic  engineering  involves  an  array  of  uncertainties  beyond 
those usually found in technological developments.”41 But because “these 
were  impossible  to  predict”  the  commission,  somewhat  tautologically, 
found no ground for concluding that any “current or planned forms of ge-
netic engineering whether using human or non-human material are intrins-
ically wrong or irreligious per se.”42 So the report concluded that there was 
no reason to “abandon the entire enterprise” given its “commercial, scientif-
ic and medical interest.”43 Finally, the commission argued that development 
was inevitable (essentially contradicting their earlier position re: Pandora), 
and thus the United States must remain involved:
“If, for example, the United States were to attempt such a step [a ban], re-
searchers  and investment capital  would probably  shift  to  other  countries  
where such prohibitions did not exist. … Assuming that research will con-
tinue somewhere, it seems more prudent to encourage its development and  
control under the sophisticated and responsive regulatory arrangements of  
this country, subject to the scrutiny of a free press and within the general  
framework of democratic institutions [emphasis added].”44
And with a final nod to future oversight committees,  the recombinant 
DNA controversy was essentially over, although many in the contemporary 
environmental  and religious communities  were unaware that serious de-
bate had been closed.
Instead, religious communities debated genetic engineering throughout 
the early 1980s, as various denominations held conferences and published 
theological and ethical reports.45 Activity culminated in 1983, when Jeremy 
Rifkin,  director  of  the  Foundation  on  Economic  Concerns,  authored  a 
“Theological Letter Concerning the Moral Arguments Against Genetic En-
gineering of the Human Germline Cells.” Rifkin, known for his resistance to 
genetic  engineering  and  fondness  for  publicity,  hoped  to  “resacralize” 
nature.46 He adopted the term “algeny” – meaning to change the essence of 





45 For an excellent chronicle of this activity see Chapman, Unprecedented Choices, pp. 27-75.
46 An anti-war protester in the 1960s, Rifkin became known for his antics in congressional 
hearings. Regarding his “resacralization of nature,” see Rifkin, Jeremy. 1984, Algeny: A New 
World, Viking Press, New York.
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ical meaning to its emerging relationship with nature.”47 This new approach 
perceives  the  living  world  as  in  potentia,  tearing  down  the  boundaries 
between species and conceiving of the organism as a “temporary set of rela-
tionships existing in a fluid context.”48 Rifkin argued that algeny was both 
an interpretation of nature and a mandate for manipulating nature at the 
same time, often at levels both novel and morally questionable. 
Rifkin’s letter attracted substantial attention because it assembled a wide 
coalition  of  59  religious  leaders,  including  Jerry  Falwell,  Pat  Robertson, 
Bishop James Armstrong of the National Council of Churches and 21 Cath-
olic bishops among others.49 A writer in  Science worried that Rifkin’s mes-
sage would receive a favorable congressional hearing because the religious 
leaders  represented  an  estimated  50  million  constituents.50 Yet  Rifkin’s 
broad coalition  fragmented  almost  immediately.  Members  of  the  United 
Church of Christ quickly backed away from a total ban. Indeed, many sig-
natories later recanted after admitting to having never seen the letter, while 
a number of clerics declared it misleading and unnecessary.51 Meanwhile, 
the Pope’s acceptance of limited germ-line engineering, following the inter-
vention of a team of NAS scientists, effectively subdued Catholic protests.52 
The controversy ended rapidly. The country’s scientists, bioethicists, politi-
cians and commercial sector supported the new biotech industry, champi-
oning its most prominent federal heavyweight - the Human Genome Project 
– in the late 1990s.
At  his  opening  press  conference,  James  Watson,  co-discoverer  of  the 
double-helix and first director of the National Center for Human Genome 
Research (NCHGR), spoke on the need to address the legal and social im-
plications raised by the new project.53 Genetic discrimination was the central 
issue to be studied, as early researchers believed that “human genome re-
search itself does not pose any new questions, [though] use of the research 
47 Rifkin, Jeremy. 1998,  The Biotech Century: Harnessing the Gene and Remaking the World, Pen-
guin Putnam, New York. Quote on 33.
48 Ibid., 34.
49 Anon. 1983, “Gene-Altering Opposed,” Christian Century, vol. 100, pp. 517. 
50 Norman, Colin. 1983, “Clerics Urge Ban on Altering Germ-Line Cells,” Science, vol. 220, pp. 
1360-61.
51 Cook-Deegan, Robert. 1994,  The Gene Wars: Science, Politics, and the Human Genome, W.W. 
Norton, New York. Especially pp. 268-69.
52 Cullerton,  Barbara.  1984,  “Connecticut Church Passes Genetics  Resolution,”  Science,  vol. 
226, pp. 674. Regarding NAS attempts to educate, or sway, the Pope, see Smith, R. Jeffrey. 
1981, “Pope John Paul Meets the Scientists,” Science, vol. 211, pp. 261; see also Kolata, Gina. 
1982, “The Pope’s Science Advisors,” Science, vol. 215, pp. 1076-77.
53 Watson, James. 1990, “The Human Genome Project,” Science, vol. 248, pp. 46. Watson’s in-
terest did not stem from religious motivations. As he later stated, “I never thought there 
was a spiritual basis for life,” and “The problem in the United States is, it’s not socially ac-
ceptable to be against god.” James Watson, quoted in Rennie, John. 2003, “A Conversation 
with James D. Watson,” Scientific American, available at: http://www.sciam.com. [Accessed 
3/18/2003.]
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data could raise very challenging issues.”54 The response was the creation of 
a co-operative project in 1990, the Ethical, Legal and Social Issues program 
(ELSI), as well as the “Genetics, Religion, and Ethics” initiative of the NCH-
GR.55 The first conference, held in March 1990 at the Institute of Religion at 
the Texas Medical Center in Houston, drew together scientists, theologians, 
and medical practitioners.56 Such conferences proved successful at diffusing 
positive interpretations of genetic engineering. Two attendees, James Childs 
and James V. Bachman, later returned home to teach young seminarians a 
“Christian” understanding of genetics.57 Although the original focus was on 
genetic  discrimination  –  an  early  ELSI  working-group  recommended 
changes to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission – the program 
looked to branch out and include other approaches, including theology.58 
Eventually, the Center for Theology and Natural Sciences (CTNS) conduc-
ted the first theological inquiry funded by the federal government.
The  CTNS/ELSI  program  represented  “professional”  bioethics.  ELSI 
wanted to consult with religious leaders and the Center for Theology and 
the Natural Sciences seemed like the “appropriate” choice: Robert John Rus-
sell, an ordained minister in the United Church of Christ with a Ph.D. in 
physics, founded and ran the Center. Although advisors suggested he fore-
go Christianity to better his science in graduate school, Russell was determ-
ined to engage, rather than separate, the two fields. Founded on a shoes-
tring budget, CTNS would “provide the media with an alternative to Jerry 
Falwell,” presenting an intelligent, and informed, Christian interpretation of 
contemporary  science.59 Loosely  tied  to  the  Graduate  Theological  Union 
(GTU), CTNS adopted an ecumenical position towards Christianity and a 
critical realist perspective towards science, as Russell demanded the organ-
ization use only the “best” science – typically physics – and shun “Creation 
Science.”60 CTNS’s “Theological Implications of the Human Genome Initiat-
ive” project became the first NIH grant to be funded for theological invest-
igation,  receiving $1.4 million for  three years of  study. Yet  questions re-
mained about the relationship.
54 Drell, Daniel. 1992, “DOE Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Program Enters Its Third Year,” 
Human Genome News, vol. 4, pp. 1. 
55 Cook-Deegan, Robert M. 1990, “NIH-DOE Joint Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and So-
cial Issues Established,” Human Genome News, vol. 2, pp. 2. 
56 Anon. 1991, “Genetics, Religion, and Ethics Initiative Holds Conferences,” Human Genome 
News, vol. 2, pp. 2. 
57 Kastilahn, Kathleen. 1993, “Back to Genesis: Human Genome Project Opens Road Map to 
Genetic Diseases. Where Will It Lead Us?” the Lutheran, pp. 8-13. 
58 Yesley, Michael. 1991, “ELSI Working Group Studies Genetic Bias,”  Human Genome News, 
vol. 3, pp. 2-4. 
59 Robert Russell,  quoted in Wertheim, Margaret.  1994, “Science and Religion:  Blurring the 
Boundaries,” Omni, vol. 17, pp. 36-44. Quote on 37.
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The  project’s  theological  approach  attracted  minor  criticism.  Richard 
Doerflinger, director of the Catholic Bishops’ Office for Pro-Life Activities, 
questioned the composition of the panel, pointing out that Thomas Shan-
non, the only Catholic,  belonged to Catholics for Free Choice, a renegade 
group with a liberal stance towards abortion (a view shared by his liberal 
Protestant colleagues).61 Rabbi Moshe Tendler  at  Yeshiva University con-
curred,  accusing  CTNS of  “packing  the  jury.”62 Indeed,  the  “politics”  of 
CTNS’s Christian theology were tested when numerous researchers seem-
ingly confirmed previous findings on a link between male homosexuality 
and genetics  in  August  of  1993.  CTNS’s cautious response differed from 
many conservative  Christians:  the  public  debate  on genetic  determinism 
pitted researchers like Dean Hamer, a molecular biologist involved in Na-
tional Cancer Institute’s genetic study, against Paul Cameron, chairman of 
the Family Research Institute Inc., a conservative lobbying group whose slo-
gan was “Scientists  Defending Traditional  Family Values.”63 By the mid-
1990s, the split between CTNS and the Family Research Institute merely re-
flected a larger schism within American Christianity – a bioethical divide 
most notable in the debate over patents. 
In May of 1995, nearly seven years after the patenting of the Oncomouse, 
Jeremy Rifkin organized another coalition of religious leaders to oppose ge-
netic  patenting.64 The  impetus  for  the  petition  came from the  Methodist 
church following approvals from the PTO on genetically modified organ-
isms after a hiatus of five years.65 Nearly 80 church leaders, including rep-
resentatives from Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist faiths, signed the 
“Joint Appeal Against Human and Animal Patenting.” In hindsight, Rifkin 
admitted not all the religious leaders opposed process patents, but main-
tained they were unanimously opposed to patenting life forms.66 Ronald-
Cole Turner and Audrey Chapman emphasize this point, given that many 
60 The Graduate Theological Union (GTU), located adjacent to the University of California’s 
Berkeley campus, is a union of seminaries ranging in denomination (including Buddhism 
and Judaism). Although the GTU did not fund CTNS, Russell taught GTU classes and the 
GTU appointed 51% of the CTNS board members. See “Meeting and Program Information” 
from the CTNS Annual  Meeting  of  the  Board on Oct.  30,  1988,  in  Box 1  of  the  CTNS 
Archives located at the Graduate Theological Union, in the Flora Lamson Hewitt Library, 
2400 Ridge Road, Berkeley, CA 94709 (hereafter referred to as CTNS Archives). 
61 Lattin, Don. 1991, “Gene Research Starts Ethics Debate,” San Francisco Chronicle, pp. A6. 
62 Ibid.
63 Jefferson, David J. 1993, “Science Besieged: Studying the Biology of Sexual Orientation Has 
Political Fallout,” New York Times, pp. A1. 
64 Developed for cancer research by Harvard University, the “Oncomouse” became the first 
genetically-modified mammal to be patented in 1988. 
65 Stone, Richard. 1995, “Religious Leaders Oppose Patenting Genes and Animals,” Science, 
vol. 268, pp.1126. The Methodist Church generally supported process patents but not ex-
clusive ownership.
66 Rifkin, The Biotech Century, pp. 66.
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of those who endorsed the Joint Appeal, particularly liberal Christian de-
nominations like the National Council of Churches, accepted the potential 
benefits of genetic engineering.67 Others, however, did not. Richard Land, 
executive director of the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, averred, “marketing human life is a form of genetic slavery,” 
adding,  “this  issue  is  going  to  dwarf  the  pro-life  debate  within  a  few 
years.”68 The Appeal, as well as Rifkin’s personal infamy, guaranteed publi-
city, leading biotech representatives to warn that patents were essential to 
industrial research and competitiveness, pointing out that patents did not 
imply ownership, but only “temporary protection against attempts by other 
parties  to  commercialize.”69 Many religious leaders agreed,  including the 
Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, which published a critique of 
the Joint Appeal.70 In a press release dated May 18, 1995, Ted Peters and 
Robert Russell stated that the religious opposition was “based on erroneous 
information” and served “only the cause of Jeremy Rifkin while borrowing 
baptism from the prestige of honored religious leaders.”71
Of course, exactly which “honored religious leaders” should “baptize” 
exactly which sciences was increasingly less clear, especially after research-
ers at George Washington University were able to create genetically identic-
al human embryos through blastomere separation – a technique separating 
early embryonic cells (the blastomere) into two smaller, but still viable, em-
bryos.72 Amid protests by the Catholic Church, NIH established a Human 
Embryo Research Panel (HERP, est. 1994) to readdress the ethical issues of 
embryonic research, bringing the abortion debate into science policy discus-
sions and catalyzing the backlash against “professional” bioethics.
3. CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANS
AND THE POLITICIZATION OF BIOETHICS
Christians re-entered bioethics in the 1990s. In 1993, amid the GWU embryo 
research controversy, a number of leading Christian bioethicists met to ad-
dress “the noticeable lack of explicit  Christian engagement in the crucial 
bioethics arena.”73 Their meetings resulted in the Center for Bioethics and 
67 Cole-Turner, Ronald. 1995, “Religion and Gene Patenting,” Science, vol. 270, pp. 52. See also, 
Chapmen, Perspectives on Genetic Patenting, pp. 11. 
68 Freedberg, Louis. 1995, “80 Church Groups Ask Ban on Gene Patents,” San Francisco Chron-
icle, pp. A19.
69 Ibid.
70 Hall, Carl. T. 1995, “Theologians Split Over Gene Rights,” San Francisco Chronicle, pp. B3.
71 Robert  Russell  and Ted Peters,  CTNS  Press  Release,  dated  May 18,  1995,  in  the  CTNS 
archives, 1.
72 Klotzko, “The Debate About Dolly,” in Ibid., 19-30, esp. 26.
73 Material from Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity website: http://www.cbhd.org. [Ac-
cessed Mar. 3, 2003.] The Center is located in Chicago, IL.
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Human Dignity (CBHD), a Christian center and internet clearinghouse for 
bioethics opposed to all forms of genetic manipulation and cloning.74 Today, 
numerous groups are involved: the Family Research Council  maintains a 
Center for Human Life and Bioethics; the anti-evolution Discovery Institute 
has a Center for Bioethics and Culture; and the Prison Ministries Fellow-
ship,  in  partnership  with  convicted  Watergate  burglar  Chuck  Colson, 
launched a Council for Biotechnology Policy. Such institutions represent the 
backlash against the “rationalization” or “secularization” of bioethics men-
tioned earlier, albeit with an important political gloss: many of the new cen-
ters are staffed by influential  conservative intellectuals  whose ideas  help 
shape the Republican platform.
The influence of conservative Christian bioethics dates to the founding 
of the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity (est. 1993). Established at 
Trinity International University, an evangelical school outside of Chicago, 
the CBHD slowly became the “hub” of conservative Christian bioethics by 
sponsoring conferences, publishing materials for the public and press, and 
training a new generation of “Christian” bioethicists. Originally the brain-
child of Trinity head Nigel M. de S. Cameron, a conservative British bioethi-
cist and founder of the journal Ethics & Medicine, CBHD listed its goals as: 
“1. Educate a critical mass of healthcare professionals, scientific researchers, 
educators, and church leaders; 2. Facilitate the work of thinkers who will 
champion the dignity of every human being; 3. Populate the media and oth-
er significant forums with credible, catalytic voices for human dignity.”75 
Within a few years, the Center’s conferences were well-attended. Intern-
al memorandum note happily that “several hundred leaders from around 
the U.S. and world gathered…to wrestle with how to really have a substan-
tial  life-affirming  impact  on today’s  world.”  Indeed;  the  gathering  high-
lighted the growing conservative Christian bioethics community, as it in-
cluded the leaders of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Americ-
ans United for Life, the Christian Medical & Dental Society, the Christian 
Legal Society, Focus on the Family, and the Nurses Christian Fellowship, 
among others.  76 Of course, the organization was also involved in publica-
tions and publicity. In summation of its first decade, the Center’s press re-
lease in July 2005 stated:
74 The group protested NIH’s policy allowing therapeutic cloning in 1999, see Bonnickson, 
Crafting a Cloning Policy, pp. 86-87. 
75 Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, printout on “Educating, Equipping, Engaging,” 
1994 or 1995 (sheets were printed for multiple years; exact date cannot be determined).
76 Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, “To Make a Difference,” 1999. 
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“As CBHD enters its second decade, it is training nearly 2,000 people a year  
through  an  array  of  Chicago-based  institutes,  conferences,  and  seminars  
along with numerous conferences across the U.S. and world – in 50 loca-
tions to date. The resources developed by CBHD include over 30 books (in  
print and process), hundreds of audios and videos, and the Advance Direct-
ive Kit. CBHD has a substantial internet presence, receiving over 16 million  
hits annually on its sites, and it is featured in major media and news outlets  
(ABC, CBS, Fox, NBC, PAX, National Public Radio, MBN, The New York  
Times, Washington Times, and Chicago Tribune).77”
Given the youth of the organization, out-going CBHD President Jon Kil-
ner marveled at its early success.78 Within merely a decade, CBHD members 
helped create a conservative Christian bioethics community, complete with 
internal journals, conference circuits, and training programs. 
Although the public tends to focus on the “high-profile” bioethics con-
troversies – embryonic stem cells or cloning for example – an important fo-
cus of CBHD is Christian counseling: most “professional” bioethics materi-
als simply don’t address family planning, genetic testing, stem-cell research, 
or a host of other issues, from an explicitly Christian, much less evangelical 
Christian, perspective. Thus many Christian ministers and counselors, espe-
cially  those advising an evangelical population, lack the appropriate bro-
chures and videos (or, in some cases, understanding and arguments). Kilner 
stressed “educating the educators” – training a new generation of bioethi-
cists and informed ministers.79 As such, in addition to frequent conferences 
for pastors, the Center works with Trinity International University to offer a 
Master of Arts in Bioethics. This program, one of a handful now at Christian 
universities, believes “There is a pressing need for trained Christians in a 
society that has lost touch with the central significance of the sanctity of hu-
man life for health care.”80 Students, each of whom must profess an evangel-
ical  commitment,  are  advised  to  find  jobs  in  “a  mushrooming  array  of 
bioethics-related positions…for example, the Christian Medical and Dental 
Associations, Focus on the Family, crisis pregnancy centers, public policy 
and non-profit organizations, law, education, counseling.”81 And the field of 
77 Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, press release entitled “New Leadership Oppor-
tunities,” (July 2005)
78 Interview with Jon Kilner, conducted at the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, 2065 
Half Day Road, Bannockburn, IL 60015, tape recorded on Sept. 21, 2006. Hereafter referred 
to as Kilner Interview.
79 Kilner Interview.
80 Trinity Graduate School, brochure for “Master’s of Arts in Bioethics,” (April 2006)
81 Ibid.
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Christian bioethics is booming, in part because of its growing influence and 
media savvy.
The Center’s board is very aware that political and media connections 
are critical to changing public perceptions of bioethics and science policy.82 
A 1999 memo highlights addressing “key bioethical issues in the media,” 
directing or informing “political-educational initiative in Washington,” and 
cultivating “relationships with key people in positions of influence (e.g. …
Francis Collins, head of Human Genome Project; C. Everett Koop, former 
US  Surgeon  General).”83 A  later  memo,  entitled  “CBHD:  The  First  Ten 
Years, Media Venues,” offers the following assessment:
1. Periodic press releases issued in response to significant bioethics-related  
developments to 6,400 media professionals
2.d. For example, when the Korean cloning of human beings to obtain em-
bryonic stem cells took place in 2004, CBHD appeared in over 30 media in-
terview venues during the two days after the announcement, including the  
NBC Nightly News, National  Public Radio, the New York Times, Prime  
Time America, MBN Radio and FOTF News in Focus
The CBHD was equally prepared for the 2004 elections; after Ron Re-
agan, son of the former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, endorsed embryonic 
stem cell research at the Democratic National Convention, its members ap-
peared on multiple channels to emphasize the immorality and inefficiency 
of the research. Given the positions of the CBHD, it naturally aligns itself 
with social conservatives in the Republican Party, providing a critical parti-
cipant in the larger movement merging conservative Christian bioethics and 
political partisanship.
William Kristol,  Wesley J.  Smith,  and Eric  Cohen are among the new 
conservative Christian elite. The Ethics and Public Policy Center (EPPC), a 
Judeo-Christian think tank founded in 1976, initiated a program on “Bio-
technology and American Democracy” in 2002 to “encourage moral reflec-
tion” on emerging bioethical issues.84 The EPPC's journal, The New Atlantis, 
edited  by  Eric  Cohen,  serves  as  a  popular  mouthpiece  for  conservative 
bioethics.  Kristol,  a  regular  contributor and former chief  of staff  for  vice 
president Dan Quayle, founded a “Bioethics Group” to counter the liberal-
82 This “awareness” was clear in numerous conversations with Jon Kilner, C. Ben Mitchell, 
Nigel M. de S. Cameron, and Dan McConchie, conducted at the Center, Sept. 20-22, 2006.
83 Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, memorandum entitled “A Demonstrated Ability,” 
(1999)
84 For an overview of  the EPPC, see  “About,” available  at:  http://www.eppc.org/about/xq/
ASP/about.htm. [Accessed Apr. 11, 2003.] 
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ism of professional bioethicists, a.k.a. “secular priests.”85 Kristol, who testi-
fies  frequently before bioethics  panels in  Congress,  believes  cloning may 
represent a greater public threat than communism or slavery.  86 Wesley J. 
Smith, a member of the “Group” and an affiliate of the Discovery Institute, 
accuses policy makers of ceding bioethics “to people who have the most let-
ters after their name,” thus giving in to scientism, biotech corporations and 
the “culture of death.”87 
To challenge this dominant culture, conservatives downplayed religion 
and constructed a secular  bioethics  based on dignity and human nature. 
The political theorist Francis Fukuyama, for example, considers the polariz-
ation between scientific and religious communities “unfortunate” because 
“it leads many to believe that the only reason one might object to certain ad-
vances  in  biotechnology is  out  of  religious  belief.”88 Instead,  Fukuyama, 
Kass, Kristol, and Cohen emphasize the benefits of adult stem cell research 
while casting embryonic stem cell research as a threat to venerated social in-
stitutions like marriage and family.89 At the heart of the debate are “human 
dignity” and “human nature,” two concepts sufficiently nebulous as to al-
low for almost any interpretation.90 Cohen, for example, assumes that a re-
spect  for  “human  dignity”  extends  to  the  embryo  (thus  precluding  em-
bryonic stem cell research), while Kass and Kristol extol the intuitive “wis-
dom of repugnance” that causes us to recoil from changing human nature 
through technology.91
Proponents of Embryonic Stem cell (ES) research challenge all these as-
sumptions. The vaunted “wisdom of repugnance” has been a poor guide 
historically:  two  hundred  years  ago,  slavery  aroused  no  “repugnance;L 
twenty years ago interracial marriage did (for some). Concerns over altering 
“human nature” are equally suspect because of the boundary between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable alterations. For example, are corrective contacts 
and hearing aids  acceptable? What about pacemakers and dialysis?  Hor-
mone replacement therapy, chemotherapy, and a myriad of other biomedic-
al  procedures  already  alter  “human  nature”  in  the  name of  “progress”. 
85 See Kristol, William and Cohen, Eric, eds. 2002, The Future is Now: America Confronts the New  
Genetics, Rowan & Littlefield, Lanham, MA. 
86 Kristol, William. 2001, “Bush's Critical Choice on Cloning,” Washington Post, pp. A19. 
87 Wesley J. Smith, quoted in Ibid. See also Smith, Wesley J. 2002, Culture of Death: The Assault  
on Medical Ethics in America , Encounter Books, San Francisco. See also Smith, Wesley J. 2004, 
Consumer's Guide to a Brave New World, Encounter Books, San Francisco. 
88 Francis Fukuyama, Our Post-Human Future, 12. 
89 Levin, Yuval. 2003, “The Paradox of Conservative Bioethics,” The New Atlantis, pp. 53-65.
90 Kass, Leon. 2002, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics, Encounter 
Books, San Francisco. 
91 Cohen, Eric. 2004/05, “The Tragedy of Equality,” The New Atlantis, pp. 101-09.
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Clearly, room for interpretation, and partisanship, exists in the brave new 
world of biomedicine. 
In  his  first  prime  time  news  conference  as  President,  Aug.  9,  2001, 
George W. Bush limited ES research to pre-existing cell lines derived from 
discarded IVF treatments. Although Bush actually extended federal funding 
of embryonic research, his position and his President’s Council on Bioethics 
(PCB) quickly came under attack for injecting the politics of abortion into 
the stem cell  debate.  Indeed, the President  failed to consult  with Harold 
Varmus, the Director of NIH, or Rosina Bierbaum, the director of the White 
House's Office of Science and Technology Policy, choosing instead to meet 
with bioethicists Leon Kass and Daniel Callahan, both of whom were on re-
cord  as  opposed  to  all  forms  of  stem  cell  research.  92 Such  ideological 
blinders characterize much of the administration's science policy. 
Relations between the scientific community and the Bush administration 
have often been confrontational. Both the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science and the National Academy of Sciences criticized the 
administration for ignoring scientific  advice; the Union of Concerned Sci-
entists and twenty Nobel Laureates chronicled numerous incidents in which 
science had been manipulated or distorted.93 The administration appointed 
David Hager – a physician infamous for advising women to use prayer to 
reduce PMS symptoms – to the FDA's Reproduction Health Advisory Com-
mission and asked candidates for scientific positions if they supported the 
President.94 Opponents  accused  Tommy  Thompson,  who  favored  ES  re-
search before his appointment as Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
of  censoring  material  from  NIH  directors  supportive  of  embryonic  re-
search.95 At the same time, Thompson’s department rewrote the charter of a 
scientific  panel addressing the federal rules for research on pregnant wo-
men so as to separate the interests of the mother from the fetus (thereby giv-
ing the fetus greater “personhood” and rights).96 The pro-life debate, and its 
religious overtones, intertwined with the PCB.
92 Thompson,  Nicholas.  2003,  “Science  Friction:  The  Growing  –  and  Dangerous  –  Divide 
between Scientists and the GOP,”  The Washington Monthly, accessed online at www.wash-
ingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0307.thompson.html. 
93 Malakoff, David. 2004, “White House Denies Playing Politics With Science,”  Science, vol. 
303, pp. 1446-47. See also Malakoff, David. 2003, “Democrats Accuse Bush of Letting Politics 
Distort Science,” Science, vol. 301, pp. 901.
94 Revkin, Andrew C. 2004, “Bush v Laureates: How Science Became a Partisan Issue,”  New 
York Times accessed online at www.nytimes.com. See also Thompson, Nicholas. 2003, “Sci-
ence Friction: The Growing – and Dangerous – Divide between Scientists and the GOP,” 
The Washington Monthly,  accessed online as  www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/
0307.thompson.html
95 Weiss, Rick. 2003, “HHS Sought ‘One Voice’ From Its Many Mouths,” Washington Post, pp. A19.
96 Novak, Kris, 2003, “U.S. Scientific Panels Bush-Whacked,” Nature Medicine, vol. 9, pp. 153.
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Created by executive order, the President’s Council on Bioethics, like the 
NBAC before it, reflected its parent administration. President Bush chose 
Leon Kass, the outspoken opponent of cloning and abortion, to head the 
eighteen member panel, which also included conservatives Eric Cohen and 
Charles Krauthammer. ES supporters groused that the panel’s composition 
pre-ordained  their  recommendation.  In  response,  the  PCB  explicitly 
avoided religious or theological  language: William Galston, a participant, 
emphasized that the PCB was “moral but not theological,” and had made a 
“deliberate  effort  to  find  a public  language accessible”  to  various  faiths, 
without reference to “theological positions” or “god.”97 Although the PCB 
found common ground in rejecting reproductive cloning, therapeutic clon-
ing proved far more difficult. Only a slight majority (10 of 18) supported the 
Council’s four-year moratorium on therapeutic cloning and some members 
later criticized the report as a “very political process” (the two scientists on 
the panel voted to expand therapeutic cloning).98 
The “politics” of the panel were on display. Chairman Kass linked stem 
cell research to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, concluding that 
now “we more clearly see evil for what it is” and thus must “steer a prudent 
middle course, avoiding the inhuman Osama bin Ladens on the one side 
and the post-human Brave New Worlders  on the other.”99 However,  the 
most controversial material surfaced in the appendix, where panel members 
were  allowed to disagree  with  the  council's  recommendations.  Elizabeth 
Blackburn suggested the “moratorium can only be counterproductive;” Mi-
chael Gazzaniga disagreed with “most of the moral reasoning argued in this 
report,” charging, “For me it is full of unsubstantiated psychological specu-
lations on the nature of sexual  life  and theories of moral  agency;” while 
Janet Rowley admonished,  “Congress should lift  the ban and establish a 
broadly  construed regulatory  board,  NOW [emphasis  in  original].”100 In-
stead, the President removed two members critical of the panel's report (in-
cluding Blackburn) and replaced them with two political scientists known 
97 Galston,  William  A.  2003,  “The  Danger  of  Absolutes,”  in  “Biotechnology:  A  House 
Divided,”  The Public Interest (Winter 2003), available at http://www.thepublicinterest.com/
current/article2.html. [Accessed Mar. 4, 2002.]
98 Weiss, Rick. 2002, “Bush Panel Has 2 Views on Embryonic Cloning,” Washington Post, pp. 
A5. Ted Peters also joined in this criticism, offering the theological support for the minority 
position  based  on  the  “14-day  rule”  exempting  blastocysts  from “embryo” or  “person” 
status. See Peters, Ted and Bennett, Gaymon. 2002, “For Beneficence, Let Cloning for Re-
search Continue,” The Scientist, vol. 16, pp. 14.
99 Leon Kass, in the “Foreward,” in Kass, Leon, ed. 2002, Human Cloning and Human Dignity:  
The Report of the President's Council on Bioethics, Public Affairs, New York. Quotes on 15 and 16.
100  Blackburn, Elizabeth. 2002, “Statement of Professor Blackburn,” in Kass,  Human Cloning  
and  Human  Dignity,  pp.  280-83  Quote  on  283.  Gazzaniga,  Michael,  “Statement  of  Dr. 
Gazzaniga,” in ibid., 290-94, quote on 290. Rowley, Janet, “Statement of Dr. Rowley,” in ibid, 
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to oppose all forms of cloning and a Seventh-Day Adventist neurosurgeon 
with similar views. 101 One of the new appointees, Diana Schaub linked stem 
cell research to slavery.102 Not surprisingly, the Family Research Council cel-
ebrated the installation of “pro-life” members, while the American Society 
for Cell Biology called it the “Friday Afternoon Massacre”.103
Of course, setting stem cell policy is a very political process. The stem 
cell controversy “changed the constituency of those interested in embryo re-
search,”  bringing  in  patient  advocacy  groups,  scientific  researchers,  and 
pro-life coalitions.104 Alliances could be unexpected: Nancy Reagan, a matri-
arch of pro-life Republicans, supported ES research because of the potential 
for  an Alzheimer  cure.105 As we have seen,  odd partnerships  are often a 
byproduct of religion and the politics of genetic engineering.
At a public policy conference in 2003, conservative bioethicist Eric Cohen 
spoke of the novel alliances created by the cloning debate. “Greens” and so-
cial conservatives oppose many advances because of fears that biotechno-
logy corrupts  nature  and human nature,  while  libertarians,  pro-business 
conservatives, and “quality-of-life liberals” view the same advances as liber-
ating individuals from the inequalities of disease, suffering and handicap.106 
This tacit partnership of pro-life conservatives with “greens” is similar to 
the partnership between the three secretaries and the Sierra Club over the 
patenting and commercialization of organisms in the 1960s and 1990s. But 
the moral position of non-humans remains a central sticking point. Environ-
mental opponents of genetic research tend to focus on preserving genetic 
diversity and stopping biopharming (using animals to manufacture phar-
maceuticals),  genetic patenting, and genetically modified foods – none of 
which has been a high priority for conservative Christians.
The political impact of bioethics may be more interesting. Reagan's first 
election marks perhaps the first use of bioethical issues – abortion and ge-
netic engineering – to mobilize conservative Christian voters. Twenty years 
later the climate remained favorable: Richard Cizik, head of the Washing-
ton, D.C. branch of the National Association of Evangelicals, opined, “hu-
101 Keim,  Brandon.  2004,  “Beyond Politics:  The Strange Saga of  the  President’s  Council  on 
Bioethics,” GeneWatch, vol.17, pp. 6-10. Dismissed were William May and Susan Blackburn; 
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102 Holden, Constance, ed. 2004, “Stem Cells and Slavery,” Science, vol. 304, pp. 1742. 
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pp. 1447. 
104 Bonnickson, Crafting a Cloning Policy, quote on 92.
105 Senator Elizabeth Dole (Rep.-NC), representing a state with high biotech investment, was 
equally conflicted. See Weiss, Rick. 2002, “An Uncertain Year for Cloning Laws,” Washing-
ton Post, pp. A1.
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man cloning can mobilize evangelicals and even take them to the polls. It 
has political salience, whereas for many of our folks, economic issues make 
their eyes glaze over.”107 Conservative Christians and twenty-five other con-
servatives, including Richard Cizik, Richard Land of the Southern Baptist 
Convention and David O'Steen of the National  Right  to Life  Committee, 
sent a letter to Bush supporting the Brownback bill. Ultimately, over thirty 
groups engaged in  a concerted campaign to pressure  Bush to back anti-
abortion judges and a ban on cloning.108
Genetic  engineering resurfaced in  the presidential  elections two years 
later.  Although  the  Catholic  Church  instructed  Catholic  politicians  like 
Kerry to oppose embryonic research, Democrats capitalized on the death of 
Ronald Reagan and support from his wife and son to highlight candidate 
Kerry's proposal to lift Bush's ban on stem cell studies.109 Endorsed by 48 
Nobel laureates and the Union of Concerned Scientists,  Kerry positioned 
himself  as  pro-science  (read  “pro-progress”)  at  the  democratic  conven-
tion.110 The Republican response was swift:  members  of  CBHD stationed 
themselves outside the convention to rebut democratic  claims,  while  Eric 
Cohen attacked Kerry for normalizing the “radical”, dividing the political 
landscape into the “party of cloning” and the “party of moral limits”111 Leon 
Kass,  head of  the  President's  bioethics  council  (an  independent  group?), 
censured Bush's critics for playing politics with the sick in a Washington Post 
editorial.112 The  political  polarization  worked:  polls  before  the  election 
demonstrated support  or  opposition  to  embryonic  stem cell  research  di-
vided along partisan lines.113 Stem cell research, and therefore bioethics and 
science policy, was now just another element of the political culture wars. 
4. INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM
What then is the appropriate role for religious voices in bioethical debates? 
And what are the goals of such debates? Certainly consensus is not the goal; 
in a religiously pluralistic society consensus cannot be the goal if any goals 
are to be achieved. Appropriate representation, given our democratic ideal, 
is  perhaps the best outcome.  But representation is  often limited to those 
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108 Ibid. 
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110 Wilgoren, Jodi. 2004, “Kerry Would Lift Funds Ban on Stem Cell Studies,” International Her-
ald Tribune, pp. 4. 
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113 Davidson, Keay. 2004, “Stem Cell Initiative Leads by Small Margin: Opinions on Funds for 
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communities,  religious  or  environmental,  supportive  of  controversial  sci-
entific research. On one hand, Francis Collins, the current head of the ELSI 
program, is evangelical, believes in an interventionist God, and is a member 
of the American Scientific Affiliation (a creationist organization). Nonethe-
less, Collins is an advocate of genome research and is supported by scient-
ists. On the other hand, few supported the Raelians’ attempts at cloning; the 
birth announcement of “Eve,” a child falsely claimed to have been cloned, 
in  December  2002 was met  with  nearly uniform dismay  and disbelief.114 
However, given the slight chance of their success, scientists were primarily 
concerned the announcement would increase the prominence of the “reli-
gious right” in genetic debates: ACT’s Michael Lanza bemoaned, “It’s the 
announcement the religious right and anti-abortion groups have been pray-
ing for,” while Senator Brownback (R–KA), author of an anti-cloning bill, 
hoped “it moves the debate forward, so we’re able to get legislative action 
soon.”115 Yet not all opponents of cloning are from religious communities.
Others,  particularly those from environmental communities,  have also 
objected to genetic engineering (although their position contains an implicit 
spirituality). Indeed, religious protests are undermined by the plurality of 
American religion, which is wondrously creative but politically ineffective; 
witness  the  fragmentation  of  Rifkin’s  coalitions.  Many  liberal  Christian 
groups,  such  as  the  World  Council  of  Churches,  the  United  Church  of 
Christ, or the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, support genetic 
engineering to  varying degrees,  while  others,  often Catholic  or Southern 
Baptist associations, have stronger reservations about genetic research be-
cause  of  positions  on  abortion  and other  bioethical  issues.  Only  groups 
defined by ethnicity have had considerable influence. And though religious 
communities have had little influence, supporters of ES research often decry 
their participation. 
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In hindsight, it is clear that the American experiment in bioethics remains 
open-ended – there will be no principles universally accepted by a diverse, 
non-“universal,”  culture.  Instead,  bioethics  reflects  the  divisions  within 
American culture, whether within American Christianity or American polit-
ics, as new research demands that the various institutions and communities 
in society – be they political, religious or environmental – respond to remain 
relevant and participate in public debate. And thus the experiment goes on.
